by Carlos Pissolito
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Ladies and gentlemen, soldiers and civilians. Most of us are, not only related with SSR, we have expended most of our lives within the sector. Working on it, learning and training on its limits.
The term security sector reform (SSR) was first introduced in a 1998 speech by UK Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short.
SSR can be differentiated from Cold War forms of security assistance in that it focuses on the security of people rather than regimes.
Over the past years, SSR has become an integral part of PSO and is increasingly recognized as an essential element in post-conflict peacebuilding.
A well equipped and well trained security force is necessary but not sufficient. We also need to help national authorities to build a culture of accountability and effective oversight mechanisms. All too often, illdisciplined security institutions become a party to or cause of conflict, victimizing the very populations they have been entrusted to protect.
What is written in this phrase is true. We military have been a pillar in our countries process of modernization.
However, we have been influenced by our formal educations and national circumstances, closely related with Cold War conditions.
Conflicts are, constantly, evolving. And we need to follow this evolution. We need to adapt in order to survive.
In the past we have learnt to be efficient in order to manage the violence from the State. Today, we need to accept that will not win the conflicts of the future due to our fire power. Furthermore, We will win them, despite our fire power.
Transparency, accountability, de-escalation, consensus, governability are the key words that should model our operations.
HARD: The security sector can be defined as encompassing all bodies authorized to use force, such as the armed forces and police; intelligence agencies and security services.
SOFT: civil management and oversight bodies, including line security ministries, legislative committees and national security advisory bodies; judicial and public security structures such as the judiciary, corrections systems, and human rights commissions; non-statutory security bodies comprising private security companies and militia groupings; and civil society actors, most notably NGOs and the media. notably NGOs and the media.
DONORS: are external actors engaged with their own interests, agenda and approaches.
UN MISSION: PSOs can have wide ranging mandates covering areas of SSR, including the provision of support for policing, correctional services and the judicial system. (MINUSTAH)
LOCAL GOV: Include: executive branch, legislative bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions + civil society organizations.
WESTERN DEMOCRATIC NORMS: the security sector is subordinate to democratic civilian authority.
All security entities should be accountable to independent oversight agencies and civil society related to issues like human rights and financial management.
Obviously, this is an the idealized relationship between government military and society. However, in the overwhelming places where we conduct missions this relationship is broken and the aim of my lecture is to examine how and why it is broken and the consequences for CMI. What can the mission reasonably expect or not expect in terms of interacting and engaging with the host country.
LOCAL OWNERSHIP: The long-term viability of SSR is dependent on the willingness and capacity of local actors to own, direct, and internalise the process and its fundamental principles. Ownership should not be solely the prerogative of elites; the process must reach out to non-state groups and the wider society to secure their buy-in.
We can identified three dimensions of conflicts: the physical, the mental and the moral. Further, we argue that the physical level -- killing people and breaking things is the least powerful, the moral level is the most powerful and the mental level lies between the other two.
This leads to the central dilemma of SSR: what works for you on the physical (and sometimes mental) level often works against you at the moral level. And the moral level is decisive.
Some examples from experience help us to illustrate the contradiction between the physical and moral levels:
If you conduct many raids on civilian homes. Surely, your troops will physically dominate the civilians. But, mentally, they will terrify them. And at the moral level, breaking into private homes in the middle of the night, terrifying women and children and sometimes treating detainees in ways that publicly humiliated them will work powerfully against us. An enraged population will provide the spoilers with more support at every level of war, physical, mental and moral.
The three classical levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical still exist in PSOs. But, all three levels may be local. We need to harmonize its local, tactical actions with higher strategic and operational goals, both of which must be pursued consistently on the local level.
What succeeds on the tactical level can easily be counter productive at the operational and, especially, strategic levels. For example, by using their overwhelming firepower at the tactical level, may intimidate the local population. And if the local population ends up hating us, that works toward our strategic defeat.
That is why in Northern Ireland, British troops are not allowed to return fire unless they are actually taking casualties. The Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that they have taken more casualties than they have inflicted.
It is not enough to defeat our enemies physically. We need to achieve a moral victory.
TIME/SPACE: While time has no limits, space is always limited. Therefore, we shouldn´t pursue immediate results. Time perception is vital in SSR.
Local Ownership: Ownership should not be solely the prerogative of elites.
Long-Term: SSR is invariably a long-term undertaking. As such it demands a high level of political will on the part of internal and external stakeholders and a durable resource base to succeed.
UNITY/CONFLICT: In order to overpass a particular conflict, firstly, we need to recognize it; and secondly, we need to rescue the valuables parts of the positions of the actors involved in the conflict.
Primacy of the Rule of Law: The SSR model affirms that all persons, institutions and entities, including the state, are accountable to laws.
Democratic Accountability: Improving governance within the security sector and ensuring that it is subordinate to democratic civilian authority is the central concern of the SSR model.
REALITY/IDEA: That principle demands our humble subordination to what realty is. Because we need to know a real situation before we can operate on it. In other words: we can ignore reality, but not its consequences.
Context-Specific: there are no template or “off-the-shelf” SSR solutions that can be applied universally. SSR is a highly context-specific process that must be carefully calibrated and shaped to reflect and engage the historical, political, socio-economic, and security conditions prevalent in a particular reform context.
Transparency Information about security planning and resources must be widely available, both within the government and to the public, with adjustments for confidentiality appropriate to national security.
Sustainability The purpose of SSR is to build a self-sufficient security sector not an external dependency.
WHOLE/PARTS: In every UN mission, there is an obvious tension between globalization and localism. Homogenization neither a folkloric xenophobia are the answer.
Whole of Government SSR prioritizes Coordination and cooperation among security/justice actors, based on their respective constitutional/legal roles and responsibilities.
Coordination, Sequencing & Integrated Policy Reflecting this reality, SSR doctrine demands careful sequencing and coordination of reforms that build upon synergies between sectors and institutions.
INITIAL: MISSION DEPLOYMENT
Enhancing state capacity (monopoly of force)
a) Security sector creation.
b) Reform and training of security forces.
c) Training assistance .
INTERMEDIATE: MISSION DEVELOPMENT
Demilitarisation and peace-building.
a) Conversion of security resources to civilian use.
b) DDD-R .
d) Child soldiers .
FINAL: MISSION ENDS
Strengthening democratic governance.
a) Justice systems
b) Rule of Law.
6 PICTURES MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH was originally set up by UNSC resolution 1542 P 30 April 2004 to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians.
.The weakness of Haitian institutions, particularly those responsible for the rule of law, remains one of the major obstacles to the long-term stability and development of the country. Of chief concern to the mission was the state of development of the Haitian National Police. While progress had been halted by the earthquake, efforts to build the capacity of the institution had started anew with the relaunching of recruitment, training and vetting activities, as well as the construction of new premises to replace those damaged or destroyed in the earthquake.
MILITARY vs POLICE: Soldiers and policemen have several characteristics in common (Warrior Ethos), as the followings:
• Discipline: They are trained to obey orders from theirs chains of command.
• Cohesion: the group comes first than the individual. (espirit de corps)
• Sacrifice: Duty first.
But also they have important differences:
Group operations Individual operations
Lethal violence Non lethal violence
Full accessibility Low accessibility
Normally, only soldiers will be available for PSOs. Therefore, they need specific training and special equipment:
Training: Riot Control/Negociation/HHRR/RoE.
Equipment: Non Lethal Weapons/Protective gear.
MILITARY POLICE(semi-militarized): force organized and trained along military lines, which may contain paramilitary elements.
CIVILIAN POLICE: A civil, non-paramilitary (police) force consisting of police officers.
PRIVATE POLICE: are law enforcement bodies that are owned and/or controlled by non-governmental entities.
Today, some experts said that If the state is to keep its compact with the people, which is to maintain order and safeguard persons and property in return for cooperation, it must focus on preventing crime, not responding to it. Preventing crime in turn requires information, which police obtain by talking to citizens. Citizens are comfortable talking to police who are “Officer Friendly,” the nice-guy cop on the beat whose uniform, equipment, and demeanor are unthreatening.
As we have seen, the main task of a Modern State is to monopolize the use of legitimate force. Both, against domestic (called security) and foreign enemies (called defense).
But, there is no single universally accepted definition of security and defense.
In some cases the term "National Security" comprises, both defense and security issues. In others, it isn´t.
For instance, the US adopted the term National Security after WWII. That means that all the state resources from police to armed forces can be use against a threat.
In others countries, like Argentina, both terms are wide separated. Which implies that armed forces can´t be use in security (internal) affairs.
Please, paid attention at the following definition of Governance. It refers to "all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language."
According to that definition, governance, needs primarily and basically, one element: power. Power is defined as the ability to influence or control the behavior of people.
But, as History and experience teach us, power may be mandatory, but it isn´t enough in order to enjoy legitimacy and obtain consensus and moral authority.
There are two types and situations when a government can obtain legitimacy. Firstly, when it is elected. It should done legally, which in most of the cases, it implied by popular vote. And, secondly, when its governance is exercised pursuing the “common good”. Which it is a good shared and beneficial for all or most members of a given community.
Normally, Anglo-Saxons authors put emphasis on the legality of the process (the observance of the rules the RoL) and Latin thinkers do in legitimacy of exercise (Common good).
However, both agree that RoL and the moral legitimacy will enhanced authority and consensus. Facilitating any governance activity. On the contrary, the lack of some of the two elements will restrains your consensus and, at the end, your power.
As everybody recognize, SSR is not easy. In fact, there are few good examples to show. Maybe MINUSTAH could be one of them. Ten years ago when the mission was established there wasn´t and state. The army had been disbanded and gangs were in charge of the monopoly of violence. Step by step, MINUSTAH managed to create and train the Haitian National Police and organized several elections from municipal to presidential. However, the process is far to be completed. Specially de SSR. Where the HNP isn´t a full capable force.@